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Indefinite or Temporary Legislation? An Argument for how the New Jersey Supreme Court 
Should Settle the Pension and Health Care Benefits Act’s Facial Contradiction 
 
Thomas P. Meyer* 
I. Introduction 
Expiration dates are ubiquitous in our lives.  They are so commonplace that we probably 
do not realize how often we encounter them.  Analyzing a simply daily task, like driving a car or 
using a credit card, illuminates how prevalent and impactful expiration dates are.  Let’s say that 
Jane drives her car to the supermarket where she intends to purchase groceries for dinner.  
Although it might not be immediately clear, this mundane task is packed with expiration dates.  Of 
course, none of the expirations are apparent or relevant until the dates have passed, at which time 
they surface to significantly alter the outcome of Jane’s day.  For example, Jane must insure and 
register her car, both of which typically last one year before expiring.  If the insurance or 
registration expires Jane’s car might be towed and she could face license suspension and expensive 
fines if she gets into a car accident or gets stopped by the police on her way to the store.  The credit 
card that Jane will use to buy the groceries has an expiration date and if the date has passed the 
sale will be declined and she will not be able to complete the purchase.  These examples illustrate 
how impactful expirations are and highlight the commonly held understanding of expirations—
once they lapse, that which was previously valid automatically becomes invalid. 
Since the inception of our nation, lawmakers have realized the usefulness of expirations 
and have included express expiration dates in legislation, which are known as sunset laws or sunset 
clauses.1  Just like expirations in all other facets of our lives, when a law or clause of a law 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.A.S. Fairleigh Dickinson University. 
1 Sunset Law, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
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expires—it is no longer effective.  Despite the longstanding practice2 of using sunset laws, 
recently, the New Jersey appellate courts have decided to ignore a clear, express, and unambiguous 
expiration clause contained in the New Jersey Pension and Health Care Benefits Act (Chapter 78).3  
These decisions cut directly against our commonly held expectations and intuitive understanding 
of expirations.  This comment will argue that these cases are not only ripe for New Jersey Supreme 
Court intervention but posits that intervention is vital to preserve the essence of sunset legislation 
as a whole.   
On June 28, 2011, then-Governor Chris Christie enacted Chapter 78.4  This controversial 
law dramatically changed pension and health care contributions for nearly 750,000 public 
employees and retirees across the state.5  Chapter 78 ushered in sweeping changes, mainly to the 
operation, contribution, and withdrawal provisions of the state-administered retirement systems 
and the operation, contribution, and benefits provisions of the state-administered health benefits 
programs.6  While there has been significant debate and litigation regarding the pension changes, 
this comment focuses specifically on the employee and retiree health care contributions portions 
of the law. 
Prior to Chapter 78, public employees collectively bargained with their respective 
employers over the amount of employee contributions towards health care coverage.  Even though 
employees and employers bargained, there was a state-mandated “floor” for employee 
 
2 Arguably, the first sunset legislation was the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, which expired by its own terms on a 
specific date less than three years after its enactment.  Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, c. 74, § 4, 1 Stat. 596, 597 
(1798) (“[T]his act shall continue and be in force until the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred and one, 
and no longer . . . .”). 
3 New Jersey Pension and Health Care Benefits Act (Chapter 78), c. 78, 2011 N.J. Laws 551. 
4 Id.  
5 Richard Perez-Pena, New Jersey Lawmakers Approve Benefits Rollback for Work Force, N.Y. TIMES (June 23, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/nyregion/nj-legislature-moves-to-cut-benefits-for-public-workers.html. 




contributions at 1.5% of the employee’s base salary.7  With the enactment of Chapter 78 that all 
changed and collective bargaining over health care contributions was temporarily halted while 
employee contributions were mandated over a four-year period.8  Section 39 of Chapter 78 
established an employee/retiree contribution schedule, which was a sliding scale with the 
contribution amount centered on the employee’s base salary.9  To alleviate the harsh consequences 
of mandating significant employee contributions all at once, Chapter 78 directed an incremental 
phase-in over a four-year period, with a twenty-five percent increase each year until the full 
contribution amount was reached.10  Importantly, the mandated health care contributions had 
limited longevity as Chapter 78 calls for recommencement of traditional collective bargaining 
procedures for health care contributions once the employees reach the full contribution amount.11  
Chapter 78 set the new “floor” for future health care contribution negotiations at the full 
contribution amount contained in the section 39 contribution schedule.12  Most importantly, 
Chapter 78 contains a sunset provision that called for the expiration of the sections that mandate 
health care contributions four years after the effective date of the law.13  Essentially, Chapter 78 
served as a state-mandated four-year progressive financial reprieve for employers, while also 
 
7 See Act of Mar. 22, 2010, c. 2, § 6(c)(2) 2010 N.J. Laws 84, 86; N.J. State Firefighters' Mut. Benevolent Ass'n v. 
State, No. MER-L-1004-10, 2011 LEXIS 154, at *8 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Jan. 19, 2011) (“Commencing on May 
21, 2010, the effective date of Chapter 2 . . . the amount of contributions by employees shall be 1.5% of their base 
salary, notwithstanding any other amount that may be required additionally by means of a binding CNA.”) . 
8 See Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ. v. Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n, 459 N.J. Super. 57, 62 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2019) (“Chapter 78 prescribed specific contribution rates for public employees' health insurance coverage . . . to be 
phased in over the course of four years . . . .”). 
9 Dawn Hiltner, Local Associations Negotiate Chapter 78 Relief, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEWS (Dec. 7, 2016 12:00 
AM), https://www.njea.org/local-associations-negotiate-chapter-78-relief/. 
10 Chapter 78, c. 78, § 41(a), 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 630.  See also Patrick Duncan, Chapter 78 – Negotiating Over 
Health Benefits Costs, New Jersey School Boards Association, https://www.njsba.org/services/labor-
relations/resources/chapter-78/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2019).        
11 Chapter 78, c. 78, §§ 77–79, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 673–75.  See also Mark J. Magyar, Christie Touts Sweeney’s 
“Courage” in Signing Penson and Health Benefits Overhaul , NJ SPOTLIGHT (June 29, 2011), 
https://www.njspotlight.com/stories/11/0629/0202/. 
12 Patrick Duncan, Chapter 78 – Negotiating Over Health Benefits Costs, New Jersey School Boards Association, 
https://www.njsba.org/services/labor-relations/resources/chapter-78/ (last visited Sept. 13, 2019).        
13 Chapter 78, c. 78, § 83, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 675. 
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functioning as a reset button for health care contribution negotiations, tilting the scales in favor of 
the employers.  Notably, Chapter 78 maintained the previous “floor” for health care contributions 
of 1.5% of base salary once contribution negotiations recommence.14 
After enactment, employees across the state fiercely contested the validity of Chapter 78, 
mainly on constitutional grounds, but it withstood nearly every challenge thus far.15  Despite the 
unsuccessful constitutional challenges, employees believed that their mandated health care 
contributions would only last four years due to the express sunset provision in the law.16  The very 
last section of Chapter 78, section 83, contains an unambiguous sunset provision that expressly 
declares that sections 39 through 44, which are the sections that mandate employee and retiree 
health care contributions, expire four years after the law’s effective date.17  As per the express 
language in section 83, on June 28, 2015, sections 39 through 44 expired.18  After June 28, 2015, 
some groups of employees and employers began to negotiate the employees’ health care 
contribution amount, as instructed by the law.  Other employees retired, believing that they did not 
have to contribute towards health care because sections 39 through 44 expired.  Despite the 
expiration, some employers continued to impose employee/retiree health care contributions, 
arguing that the contribution mandate persisted beyond the express expiration due to the language 
in section 40(c).  Section 40(c) contained language that acknowledged yet disclaimed the 
 
14 Id. § 40(a) at 626. 
15 See, e.g., N.J. Educ. Ass'n v. State, NO. L-771-12, 2013 LEXIS 1459, at *88–90 (N.J. Super. Law Div., Jun. 13, 
2013) (upholding various portions of Chapter 78 as constitutional after plaintiffs claimed the law violated their contract 
rights, substantive due process rights, and civil rights). 
16 See Chapter 78, c. 78, § 83, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 675; Diane D’Amico, Law’s Expiration May Renew Battle Over 
Benefits, PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY (Jan. 31, 2016, 5:35 PM), 
https://www.thedailyjournal.com/story/news/local/2016/01/31/laws-expiration-may-renew-battle-
benefits/79612412/.  
17 Chapter 78, c. 78, § 83, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 675 (“This act shall take effect immediately, and sections 39 through 
44, inclusive, shall expire four years after the effective date.”).  As per the express terms of section 83, the employee 
contribution scale expired on June 28, 2015. 
18 Id.  
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expiration, effectively making the expiration wholly ineffectual.19  Due to the law’s glaring facial 
contradiction, it is no surprise that litigation quickly followed.20   
In Pepe v. State, the plaintiffs were newly retired public-school employees who asserted 
that they should not be required to contribute towards health care in retirement as section 83 clearly 
indicates that the contribution scale expired on June 28, 2015.21  In the Mercer County Superior 
Court, Judge Mary C. Jacobson acknowledged the express expiration but nevertheless determined 
“it is not always appropriate to read a statute literally, but that a court must instead be guided by 
legislative intent and spirit as revealed in the statute as a whole, and in legislative history, and not 
in isolation.”22  Judge Jacobson ruled in favor of the defendants and the case was appealed to the 
Appellate Division where it was affirmed.23  Again, the plaintiffs appealed and on November 12, 
2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court denied certification.24 
Just five days prior to the Supreme Court’s denial of certification in Pepe, the appellate 
court decided another case, Hamilton Township Superior Officers Ass’n v. Township of Hamilton 
(hereinafter Hamilton),25 that challenged the mandate of health care contributions after the 
expiration date.  Like in Pepe, the appellate court in Hamilton determined that although section 83 
of Chapter 78 expired on June 28, 2015, the plaintiff retiree was nevertheless required to make 
health care contributions beyond the expiration.26 
 
19 Id. § 40(c) at 629 (“Notwithstanding the expiration date set forth in section 83 of this act . . . the parties shall be 
bound to apply the requirements of this paragraph until they have reached the full implementation of the schedule set 
forth in subsection a. of this section.”). 
20 See Pepe v. State, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *4–6 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 14, 2019). 
21 Id. at *6. 
22 NJEA Receives Ruling in Post-Retirement Medical Benefits Lawsuit , NJEA NEWS (Aug. 7, 2017, 10:49 AM), 
https://www.njea.org/njea -receives-ruling-post-retirement-medical-benefits-lawsuit/.  
23 Pepe, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *12. 
24 Pepe v. State, 083029, 2019 LEXIS 1530, at *1 (N.J. November 12, 2019). 
25 Hamilton Twp. Superior Officers Ass’n v. Twp. of Hamilton, A-0016-18T1, 2019 LEXIS 2282 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. Nov. 7, 2019) (per curiam). 
26 Id. at *7. 
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This comment serves to highlight the facial contradiction in the law and argue that both 
Pepe and Hamilton were decided incorrectly by the appellate court.  Although the New Jersey 
Supreme Court denied certification in Pepe, the issue is far from over.  The Hamilton case provides 
an example how litigation will persist as groups of employees continue to contribute towards 
health care despite the expiration of the sections of the law that requires them to do so.  Part II of 
this comment will explain the relevant provisions of Chapter 78 in detail.  This comment will focus 
narrowly on the Chapter 78 sections that control employee and retiree health care contributions, 
including the section that calls for the expiration of those sections.  Part III will assess the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence.  Part IV will address various forms 
of “temporary” and “sunset” legislation and its longstanding applications in New Jersey and 
federally.  Part V will detail the facts of three cases involving the interpretation of Chapter 78’s 
language and Part VI will provide a detailed analysis and critique of those cases.  Part VII will 
argue that interpretation of the contradictory language is ripe for New Jersey Supreme Court 
determination.  Part VIII will provide a detailed analysis of the contradicting sections of Chapter 
78 and argue that the expiration date should be dispositive.  Part IX will explain the implications 
of a finding that the health care contribution sections expired.  Part X will conclude. 
II. Chapter 78 
 On June 28, 2011, the Pension and Health Care Benefits Act, P.L.2011, c.78 was signed 
into law by then-Governor Christie after bi-partisan support in the legislature.27  The law made 
significant changes to public employee’s pension system to shore-up the strained system and it 
temporarily mandated employee health care contributions to provide financial relief to 
 
27 Laura Water, Here’s What’s Wrong with NJEA’s Strategy to Unseat Sena te President Steve Sweeney, 




employers.28  The relevant sections of Chapter 78 relating to health care contributions are detailed 
below. 
A. An Overview of the Statutory Framework 
The framework for the employee and retiree health care contributions is contained in 
several different sections with interplay between the sections. This paragraph provides a brief 
overview while subsequent sections delve into the individual sections in detail.  Section 39 
established the contribution scale for employees and retirees.29  Sections 40 through 43 mandated 
employee and retiree contributions, in accordance with the scale established in section 39.30  
Sections 40 through 43 also established the four-year phase-in period and provided a contribution 
“floor” of 1.5% of the employee’s or retiree’s base salary.31  The only meaningful difference 
between sections 40 through 43 is that each section covers a different group of public employees.  
Sections 77 through 79 established that employee contributions are to be negotiated after the four-
year phase-in period is complete.32  Section 83 established the effective date of Chapter 78, June 
28, 2011, and the expiration date of sections 39 through 44 inclusive, June 28, 2015.33 
1. Section 39 
Section 39 provided three different employee contribution scales, which varied slightly 
depending on the type of coverage provided.34  The three types of coverage are: family; member 
 
28 Marie Blistan & Ed Richardson, We Need to Make Health Care More Affordable for Educators, NJEA Says, NJ.COM 
(May 22, 2019), https://www.nj.com/opinion/2019/05/we-need-to-make-health-care-more-affordable-for-our-
teachers-njea-says.html.  See also Burgos v. State, 222 NJ 175, 228 (2015) (Albin, J., dissenting) (“The language in 
Chapter 78 clearly establishes the intent of the Legislature and Governor to create an enforceable contractual right to 
funding of the pension system . . . .”). 
29 See Chapter 78, c. 78, § 39, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 622–25. 
30 See id. § 40–43 at 625–37. 
31 See id.  
32 See id. §§ 77–79 at 673–75. 
33 Id. § 83 at 675. 
34 See id. § 39 at 622–25. 
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along with their child or spouse; and individual.35  Depending on the plan, level of coverage, and 
employee’s salary, the employee contributions ranged anywhere from three to thirty-five percent 
of the premium.36   
2. Section 40(a)  
Sections 41 through 43 cover different classes of public employees that were not covered 
in section 40, but section 40 is the only section explained in detail in this comment as that was the 
section relevant in the NJEA and Pepe cases explained below.  Section 40(a) provided “public 
employees of the State and employers other than the State shall contribute, through the withholding 
of the contribution from the pay, salary, or other compensation, toward the cost of health care 
benefits coverage . . . in an amount that shall be determined in accordance with section 39 . . . .”37  
Chapter 78 did not mandate full employee contributions all at once.  Instead, the law provided for 
a four-year incremental phase-in period.38  During years one through three, employees paid a 
portion (first year one-fourth, second year one-half, third year three-fourths) of the full amount 
established in section 39.39  Lastly, section 40(a) provided an employee contribution “floor” of 
1.5% of the employee’s base salary.40 
3. Section 40(b)(1)  
Section 40(b)(1) addressed retirees and stated that the employees specified in section 
40(b)(2) (mentioned above) shall also contribute in retirement the amount of health care 
contributions established in section 39.41  The retiree’s pension allowance, not the amount the 
 
35 Chapter 78, c. 78, § 39, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 622–25. 
36 Id. 
37 Chapter 78, c. 78, § 40(a), 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 625–26. 
38 See id.  
39 Id.  
40 Id. at 626. 
41 § 40(b)(1) at 626. 
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individual was paid while working, is used to calculate the percentage of retiree contribution under 
the section 39 scale.42 
4. Section 40(b)(3)  
Section 40(b)(3) provided a “grandfather” clause that exempted retiree contributions for 
public employees “who have 20 or more years of creditable service in one or more State or locally -
administered retirement systems on the effective date of P.L.2011, c.78 . . . .”43  Because of the 
“grandfather” clause, the first opportunity for a dispute to arise about retiree contributions would 
be five years after Chapter 78 was enacted as that is when employees would be eligible to receive 
state-provided health care benefits in retirement. 
5. Section 40(b)(4) 
Like the “floor” for employee contributions established in section 40(a), section 40(b)(4) 
established a “floor” for retiree contributions at 1.5% of the retiree’s pension.44  
6. Section 40(c)  
While the Chapter 78 sections mentioned thus far can be confusing, the true confusion of 
the law occurs in section 40(c).  Section 40(c) established that employees are bound by the 
contribution scale established in section 39 until they reach the full contribution amount.45  Section 
40(c) states “[n]otwithstanding the expiration date set forth in section 83 of this act . . . the parties 
shall be bound to apply the requirements of this paragraph until they have reached the full 
implementation of the schedule set forth in subsection a. of this section.”46  Importantly, the 
language expressly acknowledged the unambiguous expiration date contained in section 83 and 
 
42 Id.  
43 Chapter 78, c. 78, § 40(b)(3), 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 628.  
44 Id. § 40(b)(4) at 628. 
45 Id. § 40(c) at 628–29. 
46 Id. at 629. 
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immediately attempted to modify its effectiveness by utilizing the word “notwithstanding.”   
Section 83 will be addressed below, but for now it is important to recognize that the section that 
established employee contributions, section 40(c), clearly acknowledged another section that 
called for its expiration. 
7. Section 77  
The Chapter 78 sections that control retiree contributions are contained in sections 77 
through 79.47  Section 77 corresponds to the employees covered in sections 40 and 43 respectively.  
Section 77 also establishes a definitive end to the mandated employee contributions provided in 
section 40 as it expressly instructs the employer and employee to bargain for health care 
contributions once the full fourth-year implementation amount is reached.48  According to section 
77, once the parties reach the full implementation amount the parties are to conduct negotiations 
for their collective negotiations agreement (CNA) “as if the full premium share was included in 
the prior contract . . . in a manner similar to other negotiable items between the parties.”49  Like 
section 40(c), this section dictates that the parties remain bound to sections 39 and 40, 
notwithstanding their expiration, until the full implementation amount of employee contributions 
is reached.  This means that section 77 calls for employees to contribute towards health care even 
after the expiration of said sections.50  Section 77 also expressly directs that those employees whose 
contribution amount in retirement was based on section 40 or 43 shall be required to continue 
contributions in retirement, notwithstanding that those sections have expired.51  As just explained, 
 
47 See id. §§ 77–79 at 673–75. 
48 Id. § 77 at 673. 
49 Chapter 78, c. 78, § 77, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 673.   
50 Id.  
51 Id.  
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section 77 contains two more examples of how the law clearly acknowledged the expiration date 
immediately before contradicting it. 
 8. Section 83 
The very last section of Chapter 78 is section 83, which states, “[t]his act shall take effect 
immediately, and sections 39 through 44, inclusive, shall expire four years after the effective 
date.”52  As per the clear language in section 83, sections 39 through 44 unequivocally expired on 
June 28, 2015.53 
III. Statutory Interpretation 
From the beginning of our nation, the courts have been tasked with the challenge of 
interpreting statutes.  In the landmark Marbury v. Madison case, United States Supreme Court 
Justice John Marshall famously proclaimed, “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the 
judicial department to say what the law is.”54  While Justice Marshall was referring to the United 
States Constitution, this quote accurately depicts the role of the court when interpreting a statute—
determining what the law is.  When defining the meaning of a statute, “the prevailing view is that 
a judge’s task is not to make the law, but rather to interpret the law . . . .”55  Over the years, two 
general theories of statutory interpretation have emerged—textualism and purposivism.56  
Purposivists believe that courts should interpret a statute in a way that advances the statute’s 
overall purpose.57  Conversely, textualists argue that the judges should focus primarily on the 
statute’s text.  Textualists “look at the statutory structure and hear the words as they would sound 
 
52 § 83 at 675.  
53 See id. 
54 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
55 VALERIE C. BRANNON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS, AND TRENDS, at ii (2018). 
56 Id. at 10. 
57 Id. at 11. 
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in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words.”58  Textualists59 believe that this 
precept is vital to preserving the separation of powers to ensure that the courts do not usurp the 
legislative branch.60 
A.  Statutory Interpretation Jurisprudence in New Jersey 
While most scholarly articles analyze the United States Supreme Court’s approach to 
statutory interpretation, the New Jersey Supreme Court has adopted its own distinct statutory 
interpretation jurisprudence.  Professor Adam Yoffie conducted an assessment of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s approach to statutory interpretation between 2000 and 2009 and he found that 
three main theories of statutory interpretation emerged: textualism, intentionalism, and 
purposivism.61  Textualism relies on the express language of the statute, with traditional textualists 
endorsing the “plain meaning” rule.62  Under the theory of intentionalism, “the court’s objective 
should be to ascertain the legislature’s intent underlying the statute and ideally how the legislature 
would have intended this particular statutory interpretation case to be decided .”63  Intentionalism 
employs an eclectic approach that considers the text, legislature’s intent, common law, principles 
of equity, and cannons of statutory interpretation, amongst other things.64  Like intentionalism, 
 
58 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 
(1988). 
59 Perhaps the most famous textualist, Justice Antonin Scalia, argued that “focusing on ‘genuine but unexpressed 
legislative intent’ invites the danger that judges ‘will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires’ and, accordingly, 
encroach into the legislative function by making, rather than interpreting, statutory law.” BRANNON, supra, note 55, 
at 14 (citation omitted) (quoting Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United 
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 22 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997)). 
60 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New 
Modified Textualism, 19 YALE L. J. 1750, 1763 (“[S]tructurally, textualists' strong conceptions of separation of powers 
lead them to advocate a very limited judicial role in statutory interpretation, in which judicial discretion must be 
cabined through clear rules, as judges strive to ‘interpret’ but not ‘make’ law.”). 
61 Adam G. Yoffie, From Poritz to Rabner: The New Jersey Supreme Court’s Statutory Jurisprudence, 2000 -2009, 
35 SETON HALL LEG. J. 302, 312 (2011). 
62 Id. 
63 FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION, 59 (2009). 
64 See Yoffie, supra note 61, at 316. 
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purposivism focuses on the broad search for the Legislature’s purpose65 where the judges work 
with the legislature, through the use of legislative history, to determine the statutory meaning.66 
Professor Yoffie’s nine-year analysis of statutory interpretation in New Jersey focused on 
two Supreme Court eras: Chief Justice Deborah Poritz between 2000 and 2006; and Chief Justice 
Stuart Rabner between 2006 and 2009. 
During Chief Justice Deborah Poritz’s tenure as a New Jersey Supreme Court Justice from 
1996 to 2006, the court adopted an intentionalism-like approach to statutory interpretation; making 
clear that the “goal in interpreting statutes is to discern and to give effect to the underlying 
legislative intent.”67  In 2004, the Poritz court outlined its statutory interpretation approach stating: 
As in all exercises of statutory interpretation, we start with the language of the 
legislation. ¶ ‘If the statute is clear and unambiguous on its face and admits of only 
one interpretation, we need delve no deeper than the act's literal terms to divine the 
Legislature's intent . . . [h]owever, if the statute is not clear and unambiguous on its 
face, we consider sources other than the literal words of the statute to guide our 
interpretive task. [T]he Court considers extrinsic factors, such as the statute's 
purpose, legislative history, and statutory context to ascertain the Legislature's 
intent.’68   
 
Even though the Poritz court generally adopted an intentionalism approach, some Justices, 
including Justice Verniero and Justice Rivera-Soto, advocated for a more textual/plain language 
approach.69  
Current New Jersey Supreme Court Chief Justice Stuart Rabner has served as Justice since 
2007 and during his tenure the court’s approach has been described as “modified-textualism.”70  
 
65 CROSS, supra note 63, at 60. 
66 Yoffie, supra note 61, at 319. 
67 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting James v. Bd. of Trs. of Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 164 N.J. 396, 404 (2000)).  
68 State v. Pena, 178 N.J. 297, 307 (2004) (quoting State v. Thomas, 166 N.J. 560, 567 (2001)). 
69 Yoffie, supra note 61, at 333. See also Trinity Cemetery Ass’n, Inc. v. Wall, 170 N.J. 39, 44–47 (2001) (Verniero, 
J., concurring) (“[O]ne need look no further than the plain language of the Act to reach that result.”); Marshall v. 
Klebanov, 188 N.J. 23, 42 (2006) (Rivera -Soto, J., dissenting) (“The application of the legislative construct to this 
case is simple and direct . . . the mandated conclusion is self-evident from the plain language of the statute . . . .”). 
70 Yoffie, supra note 61, at 337. 
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The Rabner Court’s modified-textualism approach is evidenced through citations to two primary 
cases: Pizullo v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co.71  and DiProspero v. Penn.72  The 
unanimous Pizullo court proclaimed the court’s statutory interpretation jurisprudence: 
Our analysis requires that we first consider the meaning and intent of our 
Legislature in enacting the statute that is at the heart of this dispute. In any matter 
requiring our consideration of a statute, our essential task is to understand and give 
effect to the intent of the Legislature. In doing so, we look first to the plain language 
of the statute, seeking further guidance only to the extent that the Legislature's 
intent cannot be derived from the words that it has chosen. In the event that the 
language is not clear and unambiguous on its face, we look to other interpretive 
aids to assist us in our understanding of the Legislature's will.73  
 
In DiProspero, the court reiterated that: 
 
A court should not resort to extrinsic interpretative aids when the statutory language 
is clear and unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation . . . [o]n the 
other hand if there is ambiguity in the statutory language that leads to more than 
one plausible interpretation, we may turn to extrinsic evidence, including legislative 
history, committee reports, and contemporaneous construction.74  
 
In 2009, the Rabner court cited DiProspero and continued its commitment to stopping the search 
for legislative intent when the text is unambiguous.75  Although it was decided in 2005, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court’s statutory interpretation framework established in DiProspero remains 




71 See 196 N.J. 251 (2008). 
72 See 183 N.J. 477 (2005). 
73 196 N.J. at 263–64 (citations omitted). 
74 183 N.J. at 492–93 (citations, internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 178 N.J. 
513, 522 (2004); Cherry Hill Manor Assocs. v. Faugno, 182 N.J. 64, 75 (2004)). 
75 State v. Baker, 198 N.J. 189, 193 (2009) (declining to adopt construction against the plain language of the statute, 
even when other jurisdictions have done so). 
76 See S.L.W. v. N.J. Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 238 NJ 385, 394 (2019) (stating that statutory language is the best 
indicator of legislative intent and if the language is clear then the inquiry ends; only if ambiguity persists, will the 
court will turn to extrinsic evidence).  See also State ex rel. D.M., 238 N.J. 2, 16 (2019) (stating that the court resorts 




IV. Temporary Legislation and Sunset Clauses 
Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “sunset law” as “[a] statute under which a governmental 
agency or program automatically terminates at the end of a fixed period unless it is formally 
renewed.”77  The term “sunset law” is used interchangeably with other terms like, “sunset clause,” 
“sunset provision,” or “temporary legislation.”  Regardless of the name used, they all refer to 
statutes that contain a clause limiting the duration of their own validity.   
Historically these statutes were known as “duration clauses” or “temporary legislation.”78  
Temporary legislation has been a prevalent legislative tool of both federal and state legislatures79 
and its roots can be traced to colonial times, as evidenced by the Federalist Papers.80  In Federalist 
26, Alexander Hamilton argued for the temporary nature of Article I, §8, c. 12 of the United States 
Constitution,81 which restricts appropriations of military funds for two-year periods.82  Hamilton 
asserted a two-fold argument for temporary legislation: that temporary legislation produces the 
“deliberative benefits” of the legislature deliberating about the propriety of a law;83 and that 
temporary legislation produces an important democratic safeguard—public attention.84  According 
to Hamilton, temporary legislation allows new information to be considered at the procedural 
stages and serves to check against unwise policy as the public will be afforded the opportunity to 
“sound their alarm.”85  Hamilton further posited that repeatedly creating legislation that is contrary 
to public interest is inherently more difficult to sustain compared to a one-time permanent statute.86  
 
77 Sunset Law, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). 
78 Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 247 (Winter 2007). 
79 Id. at 255. 
80 Id. at 248. 
81 Id. at 250–51. 
82 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
83 THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton). 
84 Gersen, supra note 78, at 251. 
85 Id. 
86 Gersen, supra note 78, at 252. 
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Thomas Jefferson was such a proponent of temporary legislation that he argued that all statutes 
and constitutions should not last longer than nineteen years.87  While Jefferson’s argument for 
temporary constitutions did not garner much support, it serves to highlight the concept of 
temporary legislation’s deep roots.  
 University of Chicago Law School Professor Jacob E. Gersen conducted comprehensive 
research on temporary legislation which revealed that “temporary legislation has been used 
extensively by both federal and state legislatures. . . .”88  Professor Gersen found that:  
State legislatures have relied equally on temporary legislation, both historically and 
recently, enacting temporary legislation to control the payments of colonial rents, 
to regulate slavery, to govern welfare policy, in the riot acts, in tax policy, in 
bankruptcy policy, on physician-assisted suicide, and even in policies on cameras 
in courtrooms.89  
 
According to Professor Gersen, the term “sunset legislation” differs slightly from temporary 
legislation, but they are closely related.90  While temporary legislation dates back to the Founding 
Era, “sunset legislation” emerged at the state level in 1976 and was specifically aimed at reducing 
unfettered growth of governmental agencies and the expansion of bureaucracy.91  
Slightly different yet are “sunset provisions,” which refer specifically to clauses contained 
within legislation itself that allow the legislation, or administrative regulatory board, to expire on 
a specific date unless the legislature acts to renew.92  Sunset provisions usually require the 
legislation or board to undergo a review with three possible options: recommend allowing the law 
 
87 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES, 59 (1982). See also Gersen, supra note 78, at 251. 
88 Gersen, supra note 78, at 256 (“To name only a handful of applications, temporary legislation has been used in 
immigration policy, taxation of life insurance, election law, agricultural policy, judicial rules, inte rnational trade 
policy, internet taxation, congressional responses to judicial decisions, bankruptcy law, energy policy, 
telecommunications policy, government reform, and tax policy generally.”). 
89 Id. at 256–57. 
90 Id. at 259. 
91 Id. at 260.  See also Mark B. Blickle, The National Sunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL LEG. J. 209, 209 (1985). 
92 BRIAN BAUGUS & FELER BOSE, SUNSET LEGISLATION IN THE STATES, 3 (2015). 
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or board to sunset; recommend allowing the law or board to continue with modification; or 
allowing the law or board to continue without modification.93  
Unlike permanent legislation, sunset legislation does not tie the hands of the successor 
legislators, rather they remain free to reenact the lapsed provisions, either in its entirety or with 
modification.94  By inserting a sunset provision in the statute, the legislature is choosing to limit 
the scope of the legislation temporally without restricting the power of the future legislature and 
allowing them to act as they deem appropriate with the benefit of new information.95  The future 
legislature essentially gets to determine de novo how to proceed on the legislation in question.96 
As Professors John Roberts and Erwin Chemerinski note, sunset provisions with a limited 
life span often reflect a slim majority on a controversial issue, or a temporary solution to a specific 
problem that legislators are uncertain will work.97  Of course, through a majority of votes the 
legislature always has the option of reenacting or modifying the legislation when the sunset time 
approaches.98 
A. Reasons for Temporary Legislation 
According to Professor Gersen, temporary legislation is used to produce strategic or 
political benefits like filling gaps in the law, responding to a policy problem that itself is deemed 
temporary, or for experimental purposes.99   
One example of gap-filler temporary legislation is Congress’s enactment of a temporary 
law that mandated continuation of payments to retirees in the wake of a company’s bankruptcy 
 
93 Id. 
94 John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinski, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to Professors Posner and 
Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1784 (2003).  
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 1784–85. 
97 Id. at 1808. 
98 Id. 
99 Gersen, supra note 78, at 274. 
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filing.100  This law was proposed as a direct response to a company ceasing to pay medical benefits 
for nearly 68,000 retirees after the company filed for bankruptcy as there were no laws preventing 
this from happening.101  The specific emergency passed quickly and after the crisis ended, 
Congress enacted permanent legislation to respond on a broad scale to similar Chapter 11 
bankruptcy issues involving retiree benefits that might arise in the future.102   
 An excellent example of experimental and policy-based temporary legislation is the USA 
PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act).  In the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United 
States, Congress faced the challenge of protecting the American people from future attacks and 
responded to the emergent national security concerns by enacting the Patriot Act.  The Patriot Act 
contained sixteen temporary provisions that were initially set to expire on December 31, 2005.103  
When the Patriot Act was first debated in Congress, Senator Ron Wyden was concerned about the 
powers the Act was to bestow on the federal government.104  To assuage his concerns, Senator 
Wyden added a sunset provision to three sections of the Act that concerned him most, meaning if 
Congress did not pass a new law renewing the specific sections they would expire automatically.105  
Senator Wyden hoped the “provisions would be more thoughtfully debated at a later, less panicked 
time.”106  Many legislators still regard sections of the Patriot Act as cause for concern, which is 
 
100 See Pub. L. No. 99-591, 100 Stat. 3341, 3341-74 (1986). 
101 Dan Keating, Good Intentions, Bad Economics: Retiree Insurance Benefits in Bankruptcy , 43 VAND. L. REV. 161, 
162 (1990). 
102 Id. 
103 Larry Abramson & Maria Godoy, The Patriot Act: Key Controversies, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 16, 2005), 
https://www.npr.org/news/specials/patriotact/patriotactdeal.html. 






likely why they remains susceptible to expiration and congress has yet to remove sunset provisions 
and extend them permanently.107   
The Patriot Act is possibly the best example of temporary legislation in action.  Several 
sections of the Act deliberately contained expirations, giving Congress the opportunity to assess 
the need for their continuation later due to their highly controversial nature.  Some of these 
provisions subsequently expired without renewal, while Congress expressly extended others with 
modification.  As the sunset dates approached, Congress and the President scrutinized the immense 
power that the law conferred and assessed the need for its continuation based on the information 
available at the time. 
Temporary legislation and sunset provisions still play a prominent role in our laws today, 
both federally and on the state level.  Chapter 78 is but one example of a law that contains a sunset 
provision.  What makes Chapter 78 unique is that aside from the clear expiration, it also contains 
contradictory language that attempt to disclaim the expiration.  This facial contradiction has led to 
uncertainty and litigation, which is analyzed below. 
V. Litigation Surrounding the Health Care Contribution Mandate 
 This Part analyzes three key cases.  The first case was litigated prior to the expiration date 
in section 83 and the latter two occurred thereafter.  Of importance is Judge Mary C. Jacobson’s 
conflicting determinations in the first two cases and the Appellate Division’s acquiescence to her 




107 See Robert Chesney, Three FISA Authorities Sunset in December: Here’s What You Need to Know , LAWFARE (Jan. 
16, 2019, 12:50 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/three-fisa-authorities-sunset-december-heres-what-you-need-
know (noting the likely “legislative battle” looming over the business records and roving wire provisions of the Patriot 
Act which are set to expire on Dec. 15, 2019). 
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A. The NJEA Case 
The first case to address Chapter 78’s mandatory health care contribution scheme was New 
Jersey Education Ass’n v. State (NJEA).108  The plaintiffs, who were comprised of labor unions, 
individual union members, and related organizations, filed the complaint on March 29, 2012, 
alleging, inter alia, that the mandated health care contributions in retirement violated their 
constitutional rights.109  The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment that Chapter 78 is 
unconstitutional and a permanent injunction enjoining the state from administering the challenged 
sections of Chapter 78.110  Mercer County Superior Court Judge Mary C. Jacobson ultimately 
dismissed the health care contribution challenges for lack of standing.111  Recognizing and 
understanding the defendant’s position and Judge Jacobson’s reasoning on the standing issue is 
critically important. 
In establishing the facts at issue for the record, Judge Jacobson highlighted that section 40 
requires employees with less than twenty years of service at the time of enactment to contribute 
towards health care in retirement.112  But, Judge Jacobson also acknowledged that “[t]he provisions 
of section 40 will expire four years after the laws implementation.”113  In defense, the Office of 
the Attorney General of New Jersey asserted that the plaintiffs lacked standing as section 40 was 
to expire four years after enactment.114  The State argued that the law “grandfathered” employees 
with twenty or more years of credit service at the time the law was enacted, meaning the plaintiffs 
 
108 NO. L-771-12, 2013 LEXIS 1459 (Super. Ct. Law Div. June 13, 2013). 
109 Id. at *1–4. The plaintiff’s claim that the increase in pension contributions, the “improper delegation of authority 
to pension committees to change benefit levels and eligibility requirements,” and the increased contributions in 
retirement for public employees with less than twenty years of service violated the United States and New Jersey 
Constitutions.  Id. at *3. 
110 Id. at *3–4. 
111 Id. at *89. 
112 Id. at *13. 
113 Id. 
114 NJEA, NO. L-771-12, 2013 LEXIS 1459, at *42. 
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could not show how section 40 would adversely affect anyone because the non-“grandfathered” 
employees that would be effected in the future will retire after section 40 expires.115  Judge 
Jacobson provided the illustrative example that “an employee who has been employed for nineteen 
years and 364 days on the day the law was enacted would be ineligible to retire and receive benefits 
for five more years, at which time this section of the statute will no longer be effective.”116  The 
plaintiffs argued that some union members had less than twenty years of service at enactment but 
were able to purchase service credits so that when combined with their actual service credit it 
would total more than twenty five years, thus enabling them to retire with employer-paid health 
benefits.117  The plaintiff’s complaint provided the example of police detective Gary Souss, who 
alleged that he missed the “grandfather” exception by six months so he was not statutorily 
exempted from contributions in retirement.118  The court noted that section 40 would expire before 
Souss became eligible to retire with employer-paid benefits119 and Judge Jacobson reiterated that 
section 40 “only applies to those with less than twenty years of service and expires on June 28 
[sic], 2015.”120  Judge Jacobson determined that the plaintiffs “failed to plead clear harm to any 
individual by enforcement of Section Forty” because it had limited practical applicability and “no 
employee with less than twenty years of service at the time of enactment will be eligible to receive 
benefits until after the law has expired.”121  After determining that sections 39 through 44 would 
expire, Judge Jacobson dismissed the counts that challenged section 40 for a lack of standing.122 
 
115 Id.  
116 Id. at *49 (emphasis added). 
117 Id. at *50–51. 
118 Id. at *50. 
119 Id. 
120 NJEA, NO. L-771-12, 2013 LEXIS 1459, at *52. 
121 Id. at *52–53. 
122 Id. at *54. 
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The decision in NJEA solidified the public employees’ understanding that the Chapter 78 
health care contribution mandate was limited to a four-year duration.  Not only did the 
unambiguous language of the law declare the expiration, but the State asserted the sections would 
expire and Judge Jacobson confirmed they would expire.  This false security, however, was short 
lived and troubles arose once public employees retired after June 28, 2015, and the State deducted 
health care contributions in accordance with the schedule in section 39, despite the expiration of 
that section of the law.  Litigation quickly followed, as illustrated by the Pepe case detailed below. 
B. The Pepe Case 
Plaintiffs Linda J. Pepe, Kim M. Reilly, and Terry A. Dolbow, Sr. were public-school 
employees and members of the state-operated School Employees' Health Benefit Program 
(SEHBP).123  The plaintiffs retired on July 1, 2015, after sections 39 through 44 expired.124  The 
plaintiffs were not in the class of public employees exempted from Chapter 78 retiree health care 
contributions125 because they did not have twenty years of service credit in the pension system 
when Chapter 78 was enacted.126  Upon retirement, the plaintiffs’ employer, the State of New 
Jersey, deducted health care contribution payments from their pensions and the plaintiffs sued 
claiming they were owed premium-free health care in retirement.127  
The plaintiffs’ suit was based on three different grounds.  First, like the plaintiffs in NJEA, 
the plaintiffs made several constitutional-based challenges.128  The plaintiffs second assertion was 
a direct result of NJEA; the State should be estopped from implementing section 40 because the 
State previously asserted, and more importantly the court subsequently determined, that section 40 
 
123 Pepe v. State, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 14, 2019). 
124 Id.  See also Chapter 78, c. 78, § 83, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 675. 
125 See Chapter 78, c. 78, § 40(b)(3), 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 628. 
126 Pepe, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *4. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at *5 (“[I]mplementation of § 40 violated their constitutionally-protected ‘vested contractual rights’ . . . and the 
due process provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions.”). 
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expired.129  Lastly, the plaintiffs claimed that section 77 does not apply to them because they do 
not have CNA’s that specifically address health benefits in retirement.130  Recall from Part II that 
section 77 directs the parties to bargain for health care contributions once the employees reach the 
full contribution amount after the four-year phase-in period.  The Pepe plaintiffs argued that they 
were part of a group of employees whose CNA’s did not cover health benefits, therefore, once 
section 40 expired all retirees should revert back to the contribution status prior to the effective 
date of Chapter 78, meaning statutorily established contribution-free health benefits in 
retirement.131  Surprisingly, Judge Jacobson determined that sections 39 and 40 applied to the 
plaintiffs and subjected them to contributions in retirement.132  This determination stands in direct 
contrast to Judge Jacobson’s previous determination in NJEA, that the retirees would not be subject 
to contribution in retirement because the law expired on June 28, 2015.133   
Judge Jacobson quickly disregarded the constitutional and estoppel-based claims but 
analyzed the section 77-realted claim in detail.  The judge acknowledged that section 77 was 
ambiguous, so she turned to the “equity of the statute” to d iscern the legislature’s intent134 and 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ assertion “was contrary to the Legislature's intent .”135  The judge 
cited two cases136 and determined that the legislature “intended to make benefits, including 
medical benefits, uniform among all public workers in the State.”137  Judge Jacobson noted that 
 
129 Id. at *6. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Pepe, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *7. 
133 See N.J. Educ. Ass'n v. State, NO. L-771-12, 2013 LEXIS 1459, at *52–53 (N.J. Super. Law Div., Jun. 13, 2013). 
134 Pepe, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *7. 
135 Id. at *9. 
136 N.J. State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n  Local No. 42 v. N.J. State Health Benefits Comm’n, 153 N.J. Super. 152, 
156 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (noting that the Legislature has a clearly stated interest in assuring equality of 
treatment for employees); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. State, Dep’t of Treasury, 421 N.J. Super. 75, 104 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 2011) (acknowledging that the Legislature has a “longstanding goal of requiring uniform health benefits 
among all levels of public employees, both State and local”). 
137 Pepe, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *9. 
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statute N.J.S.A. 52:14-17.46.9(d), which is the codification of section 40, was amended after 
Chapter 78 was enacted in 2011.138  The 2011 amendment added an express reference to Chapter 
78 and also added the word “certain” before “school employee in retirement.”139  The statute reads 
in relevant part, “the payment in full of premium or periodic charges for eligible retirees . . . shall 
be continued without alteration or interruption and there shall be no premium sharing or periodic 
charges for certain school employees in retirement . . . .”140  Judge Jacobson accepted the State's 
argument that the amended language, "certain school employees", strictly referred to those school 
employees exempted from contributing towards health care in retirement; the section 40 
“grandfathered” employees with twenty years of service credit at the time Chapter 78 was 
enacted.141  Ultimately, Judge Jacobson ruled in favor of the State and dismissed the complaint 
with prejudice.142 
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that Judge Jacobson’s interpretation of Chapter 78 was 
incorrect as it goes against the plain language of the law, specifically section 83 which 
unambiguously states that sections 39 through 44 expire.143  The Appellate Division did not 
analyze any issues raised by the plaintiffs and provided a one-liner affirming “substantially for the 
reasons expressed by Judge Jacobson in her thorough, well-reasoned and supported oral 
decision.”144  The plaintiffs appealed and on November 12, 2019, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
denied certification.145 
 
138 Id. at *8.  See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14-17.46.9(d) (West 2011) (current version at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14-17.46.9(e) 
(2019)). 
139 N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:14-17.46.9(d) (West 2011). 
140 Id. § 52:14-17.28e. 
141 Pepe, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *8.  See also Chapter 78, c. 78, § 40(b)(3), 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 
628. 
142 Pepe, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *11. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at *12. 
145 Pepe v. State, 083029, 2019 LEXIS 1530, at *1 (N.J. November 12, 2019). 
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C. The Hamilton Case 
 The plaintiff in the Hamilton case was the Hamilton Township Superior Officers 
Association (SOA) on behalf of police Sergeant James Walters who retired on July 1, 2017.146  
The SOA contended that Chapter 78 did not apply to Walters as he retired over two years after 
section 83 expired.147  The court acknowledged that section 83 expired on June 28, 2015, but 
determined that it remained effective until the four-year phase-in period was complete, which in 
Walters’ case would have been July 1, 2017.148  When Walters retired he was covered by a CNA 
that remained in effect until December 31, 2018.149  That CNA expressly required retirees to make 
contributions in accordance with Chapter 78 and the court determined, therefore, that the 
expiration in section 83 was not applicable to Walters.150  Ultimately, the appellate court affirmed 
the lower court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants.151 
VI. Reconciling Pepe with NJEA 
In NJEA, Judge Jacobson determined that sections 39 through 44 would expire on June 28, 
2015, therefore, future retirees did not have standing as they would not have to contribute towards 
health care benefits after that date.152  As noted above, this was not only Judge Jacobson’s holding, 
but the State’s assertion as well.  But just a few years later in Pepe, Judge Jacobson apparently 
ignored section 83’s unambiguous expiration, and her previous holding, and instead determined 
that the State could mandate retiree contributions towards health care after June 28, 2015.  Not 
 
146 Hamilton Twp. Superior Officers Ass’n v. Twp. of Hamilton, A-0016-18T1, 2019 LEXIS 2282, at *1, 4 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 7, 2019) (per curiam). 
147 Id. at *6–7. 
148 Id. at *7. 
149 Id. at *7–8. 
150 Id. at *7. 
151 Id. at *2. 
152 N.J. Educ. Ass'n v. State, NO. L-771-12, 2013 LEXIS 1459, at *52 (N.J. Super. Law Div., Jun. 13, 2013). 
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surprisingly, the State was no longer asserting that the law expired as they did in NJEA, instead 
the State deducted health care contributions from retirees and treated the law as valid.   
Given the State’s assertion and her own previous holding in NJEA, it is puzzling that Judge 
Jacobson did not quickly reach the same conclusion in Pepe.  So, what changed?  If Judge Jacobson 
had originally determined in NJEA that the plaintiffs claim simply was not ripe, it would make 
sense that the Pepe plaintiffs were different.  But that is not what the judge held in NJEA; rather 
she determined—and reiterated many times—that there would be no future harm to the union 
employees since the sections of Chapter 78 would expire on June 28, 2015.  In Pepe, Judge 
Jacobson noted that her determination in NJEA “may very well have been in error” as the current 
plaintiffs are “in a similar position to the plaintiffs in [NJEA] . . . [but] now . . . affected by the 
continuing contributions.”153  Of course, everyone makes mistakes from time to time and even 
judges are not impervious to the occasional error.  But when judges contradict their own previous 
holding, they usually go through great lengths to either distinguish the case or thoroughly explain 
their new reasoning or explain the mistake.  Judge Jacobson did none of these and failed to provide 
any explanation why her previous holding “may very well have been in error.”   
The judge focused her analysis on the plaintiffs’ section 77-related argument and 
acknowledged that section 77 was ambiguous.154  Judge Jacobson stated that the “equity of the 
statute” aided her determination of the legislature’s intent  and reasoned that the “grid was a 
transition period . . . but not intended to be temporary as to just one particular group of employees, 
the school employees[,] that somehow were put in a more favored status than other employees.”155  
Assuming the judge was correct on both issues, the grid was a transition period and the law did 
 
153 Pepe v. State, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 14, 2019) (first alteration 
added). 
154 Id. at *9. 
155 Id.  
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not intend to treat school employees better than others, that only resolves the plaintiffs’ section 77-
related claims, but does not address her holding in NJEA that the contribution mandate would 
expire. 
 Judge Jacobson further reasoned that the Legislature’s intent was to “make benefits, 
including medical benefits, uniform among all public workers in the State” while claiming that 
“[t]he legislation . . . envisioned the continuation of contributions . . . after the expiration of the 
grid . . . .”156  It is unclear whether Judge Jacobson used this determination of legislative intent to 
overcome her holding in NJEA, but even if that was the purpose of section 40, it could not possibly 
be the purpose of section 83.   
Judge Jacobson supported her determination by referencing two cases157 while completely 
ignoring the contradiction in the law.  While the cases do provide some support for the uniformity 
argument in a general context, the argument that the legislature intended specifically for health 
care contributions to be uniform is not plausible.  If the Legislature intended for continuation of 
mandated health care contributions after expiration of the grid, the Legislature would not have 
specifically included an unambiguous expiration.  Moreover, the Legislature could not have 
possibly intended uniform health care contributions when the law specifically directs the 
employees and employers to engage in collective negotiations for health care contributions after 
the full implementation amount is reached.158  At most, the Legislature intended uniform 
contributions for four years after the effective date of the law, as that is how long the sections were 
expressly valid.  There are hundreds of different employee unions throughout the state,159 and 
 
156 Id.  
157 Id. (citing N.J. State Policemen’s Benevolent Ass’n Local No. 42 v. N.J. State Health Benefits Comm’n, 153 N.J. 
Super. 152, 155 and Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. State, Dep’t of Treasury, 421 N.J. Super.  75, 105). 
158 Chapter 78, c. 78, § 77, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 673. 
159 For example, according to the Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, in 2008 there were 550 law 
enforcement agencies in New Jersey, nearly all of which have their own CNA with th eir respective employers.  See 
Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies, 2008 , U.S. DEPT. OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. 
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nearly all of them have CNA’s with their respective employers.  If the Legislature intended 
uniformity for retiree health care contributions it would be patently absurd to not only permit—
but direct—that these hundreds of different groups freely engage in negotiations concerning the 
contribution amount.  Analyzing the law itself, rather than relying on a case from more than forty 
years ago, quickly dispels the notion that the Legislature intended uniform contribution amounts 
beyond four years.  The limited reasoning and strained determination of Legislative intent provided 
by Judge Jacobson in Pepe is not convincing and does not address the facial contradiction of 
sections 40(c) and 83.  Simply stated, the State and Judge Jacobson were both correct in NJEA; 
the law clearly calls for the expiration of health care contributions on June 28, 2015, but that was 
completely ignored in Pepe.   
After the plaintiffs appealed, the Appellate Division had an opportunity to review Judge 
Jacobson’s decision.  But, instead of addressing the expiration issue head-on the Appellate 
Division punted by affirming the judge’s decision with a generic one-liner, “[w]e affirm 
substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Jacobson in her thorough, well-reasoned and 
supported oral decisions.”160  Neither Judge Jacobson or the Appellate Division attempted to 
reconcile the facial contradiction in sections 40 and 83.  
VII. The New Jersey Supreme Court Should Settle the Statutory Contradiction 
The New Jersey Supreme Court is the highest appellate court in New Jersey and one of its 
primary functions is to hear appeals from the Appellate Division of the Superior Court.161  There 
are a few ways a case can make it to the New Jersey Supreme Court; one is through a grant of 
 
STAT., (July 2011), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2019).  Importantly, this 
does not account for the numerous other public sector jobs, like firefighters, teachers, county, state workers , etc. 
affected by Chapter 78, each of which have their own local unions with their own CNA’s. 
160 Pepe, No. A-0074-17T2, 2019 LEXIS 1101, at *12. 
161 N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 2, ¶ 2. 
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certification after petition from a party to the suit,162 and another is sua sponte.163  The Supreme 
Court’s authority to grant or deny certification, is limited by Rule 2:12-4 which provides, 
“[c]ertification will be granted only if the appeal presents a question of general public importance 
which has not been but should be settled by the Supreme Court . . . .”164 
In Pepe, the Appellate Division delivered a unanimous opinion, therefore the parties were 
not entitled to a “right of review.”165  But under Rule 2:12-1, the Supreme Court may grant 
certification sua sponte if the issue is of “great public importance.”166  The low percentage rate of 
certifications granted by the court relative to the number certifications filed illuminates just how 
selective the court is in granting certification.167  Despite the court’s selectivity, Chapter 78 is 
indeed a matter of great public importance as it effects hundreds of thousands of public 
employees168 and hundreds of employers throughout the state.  The law’s importance is evidenced 
by the numerous Chapter 78 related cases that the New Jersey Supreme Court has already 
addressed.169  All of these cases involved constitutional-based challenges, but the Supreme Court 
has yet to consider a case strictly on statutory interpretation.  In addition to Pepe and Hamilton, 
there are several other cases that raised statutory interpretation questions that have reached the 
 
162 N.J. Ct. R. 2:12-3. 
163 N.J. Ct. R. 2:12-1. 
164 N.J. Ct. R. 2:12-4.  
165 See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 5, ¶ 1(b). 
166 See N.J. Ct. R. 2:12-1.    
167 According to the Annual Report of the New Jersey Courts for the court year 2017 -2018, there were 1232 petitions 
for certification filed, of which ninety-nine were granted.  During that period, the New Jersey Supreme Court file 
sixty-five opinions.  See Bruce D. Greenberg, 2017-18 Supreme Court and Appellate Division Statistics, N.J. AP. LAW, 
(Dec. 18, 2018), http://appellatelaw-nj.com/2017-18-supreme-court-and-appellate-division-statistics/.  
168 See Perez-Pena, supra note 5.  
169 See DePascale v. State, 211 N.J. 40, 47 (2012) (holding that Chapter 78 violated the New Jersey Constitution as 
applied to state justices and judges because the law requires them  to make increased judicial contributions to the 
pension system and health benefits); Burgos v. State, 222 NJ 175, 222 (2015) (determining that Chapter 78 did not 
create an enforceable contract that would bind the State because the Debt Limitation Clause in the New Jersey 
Constitution prohibited the Legislature from doing so); Berg v. Christie, 225 N.J. 245, 280 (2016) (upholding Chapter 
78’s suspension of the cost of living adjustments in retirement). 
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Appellate Division170 but none have resolved the expiration issue, and none have reached the 
Supreme Court.   
 The breadth and impact of Chapter 78 is immense as it effects nearly all public employees 
and retirees in New Jersey, a number reaching hundreds of thousands.171  The financial 
implications on both employees and employers are enormous, yet one pivotal question remains 
unaddressed by the Supreme Court; how can some provisions of Chapter 78 expressly expire yet 
remain effective to bind employees and retirees beyond their expiration?  This issue is ripe for 
determination and the Supreme Court should grant certification to interpret the statute and make a 
bright line rule.  The Supreme Court’s recent denial of certification in Pepe will likely do nothing 
to discourage the hundreds of unions and thousands of employees who all have standing to sue on 
this unanswered issue.  Cases like Hamilton indicate that litigation will continue until the Supreme 
Court squarely addresses Chapter 78’s facial contradiction.  The Supreme Court should 
acknowledge the importance of this issue, and the fact that it will persist, and grant certification to 
review the Hamilton case and settle the dispute with finality. 
VIII.  Reconciling the Conflict 
 
 If the Supreme Court reviews the Hamilton case, they will have to grapple with the 
conflicting sections to make the ultimate determination.  This Part utilizes the cannons of statutory 




170 See In re New Brunswick Mun. Emps. Ass'n, 453 N.J. Super. 408 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018); Brick Twp. 
PBA Local 230 v. Twp. of Brick, 446 N.J. Super. 61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2016); In re Clementon Bd. of Educ., 
No. A-0372-15T1, 2016 LEXIS 2163 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sep. 30, 2016); Ridgefield Park Bd. of Educ. v. 
Ridgefield Park Educ. Ass'n, 459 N.J. Super. 57, (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2019). 
171 See Perez-Pena, supra note 5. 
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A.  Section 83 is Unambiguous 
As explained in Part II above, the sunset provision in Chapter 78 provides, “[t]his act shall 
take effect immediately, and sections 39 through 44, inclusive, shall expire four years after the 
effective date.”172  Section 83 contains only twenty words and is one of the shortest sections of the 
extensive 124-page law.  Section 83 is concise, yet unmistakably clear and a reasonable person 
could only construe the language literally; sections 39 through 44 expire four years after the 
effective date.  
Importantly, the word “shall” is utilized twice in this section; first to signal the 
commencement of the Act and second to signal the expiration of the named relevant sections.173  
The word “shall” is commonly used in statutes and the United States Supreme Court precedent 
provides that “shall” generally serves as a mandatory command, rather than permissive action.174  
The New Jersey Supreme Court maintained a similar position in State v. Thomas, where the court 
assessed the meaning of “shall” in criminal statute 2C:43-6(f).175  The New Jersey Supreme Court 
determined that the word “shall” “clearly indicates that the Legislature meant enhancement to be 
mandatory.”176 
Given the New Jersey Supreme Court precedent that “shall” is a mandatory phrase, the 
unambiguous express language in section 83 can be interpreted but only one way—sections 39 
 
172 Chapter 78, c. 78, § 83, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 675. 
173 See id. 
174 Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35 (1998) (“The mandatory ‘shall’ . . . 
normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”). 
175 The statute states, “shall upon application of the prosecuting attorney be sentenced by the court to an extended 
term.”  N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(f).  
176 State v. Thomas, 188 N.J. 137, 149–50 (2006) (emphasis added).  See IA Sutherland Statutes and Statutory 
Construction, § 25:4 (Norman J. Singer ed., 6th ed. 2000) (“Whether a statute should be given mandatory . . . effect 
is . . . a  question of statutory construction to which all of the rules and principles of construction are applicable . . . [ ; 
however,] [u]nless the context otherwise indicates a use of the word ‘shall’ (except in future tense) indicates a 
mandatory intent.”).  See also Harvey v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 30 N.J. 381, 391 (1959) (observing that “[t]he 
word ‘may’ is ordinarily permissive or directory, and the words ‘must’ and ‘shall’ are generally mandatory”). 
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through 44 unequivocally expired on June 28, 2015.177  According to the New Jersey Supreme 
Court’s longstanding statutory interpretation jurisprudence conveyed in DiProspero, “[a] court 
should not resort to extrinsic interpretative aids when the statutory language is clear and 
unambiguous, and susceptible to only one interpretation . . . .”178  There is no authority to go 
beyond the language of section 83 as the language is unmistakably clear, sections 39 through 44 
expired on June 28, 2015.179 
B.  Section 40(c) is Unambiguous 
 As discussed in Part II, section 40(c) states, “[n]otwithstanding the expiration date set forth 
in section 83 of this act, P.L.2011, c.78, or the expiration date of any successor agreements, the 
parties shall be bound to apply the requirements of this paragraph until they have reached the full 
implementation of the schedule . . . .”180  Section 40(c) also incorporates the word “shall”, which 
suggests a mandatory continuation of employee contributions until full implementation is reached, 
but it also acknowledges section 83’s expiration.  If the contributions continue until the full amount 
is reached as section 40(c) instructs then section 83 is left entirely ineffective.  Conversely, if 
section 40 expired as section 83 instructs then section 40(c) is rendered ineffective. 
C. Section 83 and Section 40(c) are Irreconcilable 
When looking at the contradiction of sections 83 and 40(c), a key interpretive question 
arises; can the two sections be reconciled?  In 2012, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia and 
Bryan Garner published a book outlining many of the existing canons of statutory interpretation, 
 
177 See Chapter 78, c. 78, § 83, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 675. 
178 183 N.J. 477, 492–93 (2005) (citations, internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Const., 
178 N.J. 513, 522 (2004)). 183 N.J. 477 (2005). See also S.L.W. v. N.J. Div. of Pensions & Benefits, 238 NJ 385, 394 
(2019) (stating that statutory language is the best indicator of legislative intent  and if the language is clear then the 
inquiry ends; only if ambiguity persists, will the court will turn to extrinsic evidence).  See also State ex rel. D.M., 
238 N.J. 2, 16 (2019) (stating that the court resorts to extrinsic evidence, like legislative history, only when the 
statutory language is susceptible to more than one interpretation). 
179 See Chapter 78, c. 78, § 83, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 675. 
180 Id. § 40(c) at 629. 
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one of which addresses contradictory language.181  The “harmonious-reading” cannon provides 
that when possible, “[t]he provisions of a text should be interpreted in a way that renders them 
compatible, not contradictory.”182  If the two sections cannot be reconciled, a second interpretive 
question arises; which section should prevail?  The New Jersey Supreme Court has stated, “[w]hen 
there is a conflict in interpretation, we turn to the well-established canon of construction that a 
legislative provision should not be read in isolation or in a way which sacrifices what appears to 
be the scheme of the statute as a whole.”183  These two important questions will be analyzed below. 
First, there is no plausible argument that section 83 does not mean what it says as the 
express language is concise, direct, and unambiguous.  As noted above, the longstanding New 
Jersey Supreme Court precedent provides that courts do not resort to alternative sources to interpret 
statutes when the language is unambiguous and clear on its face.184  Moreover, even the State 
asserted in NJEA that the expiration in section 83 was indeed valid and thus sections 39 through 
44 would expire and prevent the plaintiffs from suffering a harm.  Additionally, sections 40 
through 44185 and sections 77 through 79186 all expressly acknowledge section 83’s clear 
expiration.  Even the most strained reading of section 83 would provide but one interpretation—
sections 39 through 44 expired on June 28, 2015.   
While section 40(c) acknowledges section 83, it attempts to defeat the expiration date by 
utilizing the term “notwithstanding.”187  Read in isolation, section 40(c) is also unambiguous as it 
instructs the employees to disregard the expiration and continue contributions until the section 39 
 
181 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (West ed., 
2012) 
182 Id. at 180 (2012). 
183 Dunbar Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of Twp. of Franklin, 233 N.J. 546, 559 (2018) (internal quotations 
omitted) (quoting Koch v. Dir., Div. of Taxation, 157 N.J. 1, 7 (1999)). 
184 See DiProspero v. Penn, 183 N.J. 477, 492–93 (2005). 
185 See Chapter 78, c. 78, §§ 40–44, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 625–37. 
186 See id. §§ 77–79 at 673–75. 
187 See id. § 40(c) at 628–29. 
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scale is fully-implemented.  But when read simultaneously with section 83, a quandary arises that 
simply cannot be cured.  The sections are mutually exclusive and either “shall” expire or “shall” 
continue, but both simply cannot be true.  There is no way to achieve a “harmonious-reading” as 
the sections are unambiguous and mutually exclusive. 
D. Interpreting Chapter 78 as a Whole to Determine Which Section Should Prevail 
  Since the “harmonious-reading cannon” does not resolve the conflict the court should 
analyze Chapter 78 as a whole to determine which section should prevail.188  Looking at Chapter 
78 as a whole suggests that the Legislature intended for the statutorily required health care 
contribution to end four years after the effective date.  Although not analyzed in this comment, 
recall that one of the main goals of Chapter 78 was to shore-up the failing pension system, hence 
the sweeping pension changes in the law.189  It is important to highlight that all of Chapter 78’s 
pension-related changes are permanent and the only sections of the law that expire are section 40 
through 44.190  Considering that an overwhelming majority of the law, seventy-seven of eighty-
three sections (approximately 92%), was expressly permanent in nature, it is hard to even conceive 
a plausible argument why the legislature would insert a definitive, mandatory expiration date on 
only six select sections if they did not intend for those specific sections to expire.   
As noted in Part IV, Professors Roberts and Chemerinski highlighted that sunset provisions 
often indicate a slim majority on a controversial issue, or a temporary solution to a specific problem 
that legislators are uncertain will work.191  Either of those reasons provide a convincing 
explanation for the inclusion of the expiration date.   
 
188 See Dunbar Homes, 233 N.J. at 559 (declaring that the court should assess the legislation as a whole, rather than 
sections in isolation, to resolve conflicts in statutory interpretation). 
189 See S. 2937, 214th Leg. (N.J. 2011) Senate statement indicates that the pension changes included: mandating state 
contributions; increasing public employee contributions; changing retiree eligibility dat es; suspending cost of living 
adjustments; and changing the pension board. 
190 See Chapter 78, c. 78, § 83, 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 675. 
191 Roberts & Chemerinski, supra note 94, at 1808. 
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First, Chapter 78 was indeed a controversial issue and the sunset provision was likely 
included to appease the apprehensive democrat legislators to garner enough support for the bill to 
become a law.  While Chapter 78 was dubbed a “bi-partisan bill” by the media, it was staunchly 
opposed by many democrat legislators.192  Labor unions throughout the state emphatically 
denounced the bill and pressured democrat senators to oppose the bill.193  Incorporating a 
conspicuous, unambiguous, mandatory expiration date as the last section of the law would likely 
have assuaged the concerns of enough democrat senators to enable the requisite number of “yes” 
votes to pass the controversial law.   
Next, assessing other legislation enacted around the time Chapter 78 was enacted provides 
insightful context as to the specific problems the state was facing.  In 2010 and 2011 the State was 
in the midst of a financial crisis and was seeking to alleviate some of the mounting financial 
pressure through property tax relief measures.194  In July 2010, the State enacted a law which 
reduced school district, county, and municipal property tax levy cap from 4% to 2%.195  This 2% 
property tax levy cap was permanent legislation and is still in place today.  In December 2010, the 
State enacted a law that implemented a 2% cap on salaries for all arbitration awards for police 
 
192 Salvador Rizzo, Some N.J. Democrats Tell Protesters They Will Not Vote for Public Worker Pension Overhaul, 
NJ.COM (June 16, 2011), https://www.nj.com/news/2011/06/nj_democrats_tell_protesters_t.html.  (“Assembly 
members Wayne DeAngelo, Daniel Benson, Patrick Diegnan, Reed Gusciora, Vincent Prieto and Connie Wagner, 
and state Sen. Ray Lesniak, blasted the legislation and said the changes being proposed should be negotiated, not 
legislated.”). 
193 Christopher Baxter, Hundreds of N.J. Public Workers Descend on Statehouse to Protest Proposed Changes to 
Pensions, Health Benefits, NJ.COM (June 16, 2011), 
https://www.nj.com/news/2011/06/hundreds_of_public_workers_dss.html.  (“They came by the hundreds, by bus and 
by car, jamming the streets and crowding the sidewalks, each with a sign and a cause and a glimmer of hope that they 
might convince New Jersey's top political leaders to scrap a plan to make them pay more for their pension and health 
benefits.”). 
194 See Making Sense of Gov. Christie's Local Government Tool Kit , NJ.COM (Nov. 21, 2010), 
https://www.nj.com/news/2010/11/making_sense_of_gov_christies.html (“Christie also proposed the state enact a 
series of measures he calls a tool kit to help local governments keep increases in property tax collections to that 2 
percent limit without having to make massive layoffs and cuts to services.”) 
195 See Act of July 13, 2010, c. 44, § 9, 2010 N.J. Laws 735, 759. 
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officers and firefighters.196  Importantly, the 2% arbitration cap law became effective in 2011 and 
contained a sunset clause stating that the law expired on April 1, 2014.197  As news sources from 
the time report, both of these cap-related laws “were key elements of Gov. Chris Christie’s 
signature, first-term ‘toolkit’ initiative that was aimed at addressing local property-tax increases 
that were averaging as much as 7 percent at the time.”198  
 The arbitration cap law provides an excellent example of sunset provisions at work in New 
Jersey, but more importantly it provides strong support that Chapter 78 was intended to be 
temporary.  The arbitration cap law expired on April 1, 2014 after the legislators failed to strike a 
deal for its continuance.  But, shortly after the law expired a new compromise was reached in June 
2014, and the arbitration cap was reinstated with a new sunset date of December 31, 2017.199  As 
noted in Part IV, the legislature essentially has three options with sunsetting laws: recommend 
allowing the law to sunset; recommend allowing the law to continue with modification; or allowing 
the law to continue without modification.200  The law expired again on December 31, 2017, which 
illustrates the Legislature’s refusal to continue statutory intervention on public employee benefits 
that have historically been the subject of collective bargaining.  Most notably, the Legislature could 
have made the arbitration cap law permanent but elected not to—not only once, but twice.  The 
Legislature could have easily made Chapter 78’s health care contributions permanent like the 
pension reform portions of the law simply by doing nothing.  Instead, the Legislature made the 
intentional decision to include a concise and unambiguous expiration.   
 
196 Act of Dec. 21, 2010, c. 105, § 2(b), 2010 N.J. Laws 1204, 1210. 
197 Id. § 4 at 1212.  See John Reitmeyer, Why NJ’s Cap on Raises for Cops and Firefighters Is Set to Expire , NJ 
SPOTLIGHT (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.njspotlight.com/2017/09/17-09-11-explainer-why-nj-s-arbitration-cap-on-
raises-for-cops-and-firefighters-is-set-to-expire/. (“[T]o reach agreement on the issue, the cap on the interest -
arbitration awards was initially set up to be temporary, with a sunset date of April 2014.”). 
198 Reitmeyer, supra note 197. 
199 Id. 
200 BAUGUS & BOSE, supra note 92. 
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As discussed in Part IV above, the distinction that separates temporary legislation from 
permanent legislation is that temporary legislation has a definitive end.201  Temporal limitations 
permit future legislatures to reassess the need for the law with the most current and up to date 
information.  As Professor Gersen highlighted, sunset provisions often serve as experimentation 
and sometimes laws are temporary in nature for policy-based reasons.202  One such policy-based 
reason is the financial crisis that New Jersey was experiencing when the 2% arbitration cap law 
and Chapter 78 were enacted.   
Whether the intent was to quell political resistance or implement a temporary fix to a 
specific financial problem, the sunset clause was intentionally included by the Legislature clearly 
indicating the intent that it must be effective. 
Of course, there is a counterargument; the Legislature intended for the employee 
contributions to persist beyond June 28, 2015, hence the inclusion of the language, “the parties 
shall be bound to apply the requirements of this paragraph until they have reached the full 
implementation of the schedule.”203  Proponents of this argument would likely assert this language 
suggests that the Legislature intended to statutorily bring all public employees to an identical 
contribution level before reinstating collective bargaining procedures for health care contribution 
amounts.  While this view appears logical on its face, it invites an obvious question; if that was 
indeed the intent, then why did the Legislature include an unambiguous expiration date for only 
those specific sections of the law?  
One possible answer is that this assertion is simply wrong, and the Legislature intended a 
temporally limited employer reprieve to address the financial crisis.  The other possible answer is 
 
201 See supra Part IV. 
202 Gersen, supra note 78, at 274. 
203 See Chapter 78, c. 78, § 40(c), 2011 N.J. Laws 551, 629. 
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that the expiration date was included to appease the opposing political party to attain enough votes 
to pass the law.  If the latter is correct, then section 40(c) is nothing more than the drafting 
legislators’ attempt at “having their cake and eating it too.”  Implementing the unambiguous 
expiration in section 83 to garner enough support to pass the law was the Legislature “having their 
cake.”  The “eating it too” part of the idiomatic proverb has come in the form of the Appellate 
Court’s approval of section 40(c) in the face of the very expiration that likely induced passage of 
the law in the first place.  If this is indeed the true reason the drafters included the unambiguous 
expiration date, then the courts should vigorously uphold it.  Without its inclusion, the law might 
have never passed. 
IX. Intuitive Statutory Construction 
 Since section 83 and section 40(c) are both unambiguous yet cannot be construed 
harmoniously, the textualist plain-meaning approach simply does not work.  As the purposivist  
and intentionalist approaches instruct, the court must turn elsewhere to discern the meaning of the 
statute.  The court should turn to concepts established in contract law for guidance.  In 2011, 
several consolidated plaintiffs sued New Jersey claiming that a 2010 law, P.L.2010, c.2 (Chapter 
2), that mandated employee health care contributions was unconstitutional.204  Judge Linda R. 
Feinberg of the Mercer County Superior Court Law Division delivered the opinion.  One of the 
plaintiff’s claims was that the law usurped the Contracts Clause of the Federal and State 
Constitutions as they had valid CNA’s when the law became effective.205  Judge Feinberg 
determined that the constitutional-based claim was not valid.206  Importantly, Judge Feinberg 
 
204 N.J. State Firefighters' Mut. Benevolent Ass'n v. State (Firefighters’), No. MER-L-1004-10, 2011 LEXIS 154, at 
*11–36 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2011). 
205 Id. at *94.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, ¶ 3. 
206 Firefighters’, No. MER-L-1004-10, 2011 LEXIS 154, a t *105. 
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highlighted that Chapter 2 took effect only after the CNA’s expired,207 which was vitally important 
to the assertion that the law violated the Contracts Clause.  In assessing whether a contract existed 
after its express expiration date, Judge Feinberg declared, “[o]nce the CNA has expired, no 
contract exists and the parties no longer operate under contractual obligations. The statute cannot 
impair a contract that, by its terms, has expired.”208  Essentially, Judge Feinberg dismissed the 
plaintiff’s claims that the law violated the Contracts Clause because once their contracts expired, 
they were no longer contracts.209   
Judge Feinberg’s reasoning provides a useful framework of how to treat an expired section 
of a statute.  The judge’s reasoning intuitively makes sense and comports with the common 
understanding of expirations as was illustrated by Jane and her car insurance and credit card woes 
in the introduction of this comment.  The court should apply this same logic to Chapter 78; once 
sections 39 through 44 expired on June 28, 2015, they should no longer have force and effect.  Just 
like a contract is no longer a contract after it expires, sections of a law should no longer be effective 
once they expire.  Following the logic, section 40(c) simply cannot disclaim the expiration to 
continue employee and retiree contributions once it has expired. 
X. Conclusion 
It is undisputed, even the most progressive-minded judges agree, that the court should not 
insert its opinion for that of the Legislature.  This is espoused in the separation of powers doctrine 
and has deep, longstanding roots in our case law, both in New Jersey and federally. While the 
Court cannot usurp the Legislature, they are indeed responsible for determining what the law 
means.  This comment was meant to highlight the confusion that the contradictory language in 
 
207 Id. at *103. 
208 Id. at *99 (emphasis in original). 
209 See id. 
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Chapter 78 has created.  Employees, employers, the State, and the courts alike are all navigating 
this unsettled law without a precedential determination of what the conflicting sections mean.  
Amidst all this confusion and litigation, the silence of the New Jersey Supreme Court is deafening.  
Given the law’s glaring contradiction, the New Jersey Supreme Court has an obligation to 
determine how the law should be applied.  Although the Supreme Court missed the opportunity in 
Pepe, fortunately there is a chance at vindication with the Hamilton case.  If the New Jersey 
Supreme Court fails to act, a parade of similar litigation is likely to follow as thousands of 
employees might remain bound to the Chapter 78 contribution scheme beyond its clear expiration.  
The New Jersey Supreme Court should grant certification, overrule Hamilton, and determine that 
the mandated employee/retiree health care contribution scheme contained in section 39 through 44 
of Chapter 78 expired on June 28, 2015 and are thus no longer valid.  
